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Abstract
Brain-computer interfaces (BCI) allow human subjects to interact with ex-
ogenous systems through neural signals. The goal of this interaction may
be to induce behaviors or properties in either the exogenous system or the
human subject. In this thesis, we develop a novel framework for designing
BCIs based on principles from adaptive control. In particular, we exploit
scalp electroencephalography-derived correlates of the human error process-
ing system to recover a subject's desired policy for the exogenous system.
This scheme allows a human subject to control a system through passive
observation by critiquing actions taken by the system. We provide a neces-
sary and sucient condition for convergence and simulations as a proof of
concept. Further, we discuss the application of this framework to building
co-adaptive BCIs and as a tool for understanding the learning process during
BCI interaction.
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The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.
{Archilochus
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electroencephalography (EEG) has been used by cognitive psychophysiolo-
gists since the early part of the 20th century to link scalp potentials to human
behaviors [19]. These scalp potentials are believed to be produced by super-
imposing electric elds induced by currents in the cortex of the brain [33].
A sizable library of voltage deections and rhythms have been discovered
that are reliably elicited in a laboratory setting and correlated with human
behavioral events [5]. Recently impelled by cheap digital signal processing
hardware and clinical motivation, investigators have detected these signals
during on-line tasks to control exogenous systems and provide feedback to
subjects. Through these applications the nascent eld of EEG-based brain-
computer interfaces (EEG-BCI) has emerged.
EEG-BCI consists of a wide variety of paradigms that permit commu-
nication and control of exogenous systems. In 1988, Farwell and Donchin
introduced the P300 speller, which allows subjects to spell sentences by star-
ing at a grid of ashing letters [16]. When the letter they wish to write is
illuminated, subjects experience surprise and evoke the P300 ERP. By de-
tecting these voltage deections on multiple trials, the intended letter can be
inferred. Other BCI paradigms exploit dierent signals. The mu-rhythm mo-
tor paradigm allows subjects to control systems through motor imagery [2].
By imagining squeezing the left or right hand, neuronal populations in the
cortex can be desynchronized. This event-related desynchronization can be
detected in the power spectrum of the 10 Hz mu-rhythm. In general, EEG-
BCIs such as the P300 speller and motor imagery are an emerging modality
for communication and control of exogenous systems.
There are compelling clinical reasons to study EEG-BCI. At present, it is
not possible to restore normal motor function in people with progressive or
acute neurological conditions such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS),
Parkinson's, or stroke. A signicant amount of research has concerned the
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application of EEG-BCI to restore motor function in patients by facilitat-
ing control of computer cursors and robotic arms through EEG signals [44].
Control of exogenous systems using EEG has been a hallmark of the eld
since its inception, and it continues to comprise the bulk of new literature
entering the eld today.
In recent years, attention has shifted to the adaptive nature of the brain
during BCI interaction. Several studies have shown that subjects can learn
to volitionally modulate or amplify features of their EEG over time through
appropriate feedback [2]. Researchers have hypothesized that BCIs might
be able to restore normal or close-to-normal motor function by inducing
activity-dependent brain plasticity [11]. This hypothesis has motivated a
new philosophical perspective that considers EEG-BCI as a problem of co-
evolving coupled dynamical systems. Research in this domain suggests that
it may be possible to guide learning by training people to modulate or elicit
specic scalp potentials. To date, there is mild evidence that this may be pos-
sible; but conclusive proof and useful models are lacking [11]. The problem
is made dicult because the signals that should be targeted during therapy
and the nature of brain-machine co-adaptation are not well understood.
Understanding human-machine co-adaptation is not restricted to clinical
applications. EEG signals are inherently non-stationary, and the brain is a
complex system that processes multiple impinging stimuli in parallel. If the
EEG is truly reective of cortical activity, many of these processes may con-
tribute to measured scalp potentials. In order to parse this complex signal in
a principled manner, it is useful to develop robust control frameworks that
both achieve systems engineering objectives and allow for scientic hypothe-
ses about observed signals to be tested.
This thesis attempts to achieve these dual scientic and engineering ob-
jectives by developing a principled framework for understanding human-BCI
co-adaptation while building a novel BCI based on passive observation. A
recent body of literature has identied a class of error potentials that are
elicited by a generic, high-level error processing system [21]. Termed the
Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN), these error signals are elicited when
unexpected outcomes occur during tasks of choice economy [7]. Recent evi-
dence has also indicated that these signals are elicited during observation of
an agent that acts on a subject's behalf [39]. It has been proposed that the
FRN is reective of a reinforcement learning process in the human subject
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under both the active and passive observation conditions [21]. Further, it
has been shown that the FRN scales with prediction error, suggesting that
it encodes the hidden policy that the subject wishes to impose on the BCI
agent. By modeling the observer as a reinforcement learning system, princi-
ples from stochastic control can be applied to design BCI agents that extract
this hidden policy and act optimally with respect to each subject.
This thesis will develop a principled framework to design BCI agents that
are optimal with respect to human learners by measuring these prediction
error signals. Chapter 2 will review the neural basis of prediction error
signals. Further, it will introduce the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN)
and argue that the observational form of the FRN (oFRN) is generated by
the same error processing system. Chapter 3 will formalize the reinforcement
learning model of the FRN and describe the BCI design problem in detail.
The Bayesian control rule will be introduced as a technique for designing
co-adaptive BCIs. A necessary condition for convergence will be presented,
and sucient conditions will be summarized. Chapter 4 will present proof-
of-concept simulations. Chapter 5 will discuss future work and potential
applications. The appendix contains detailed mathematical derivations and
code to implement the simulations.
3
Chapter 2
Neural Correlates of Prediction Error and
Learning
In order for learning to occur, humans must be able to evaluate the outcomes
of their actions and make predictions about how an environment will respond
to perturbations. For instance, while a subject interacts with a BCI agent,
the BCI algorithm elicits feedback. The subject must use this feedback to
decide how issuing a certain command has worked and predict how it will
tend to work in the future. Recent studies conrm that subjects change their
strategy relative to feedback [7]. By incorporating signals that reect learning
into the control scheme, BCI agents can be made optimal with respect to each
unique learner, and sensitive to ongoing behavioral adaptation.
While many brain regions and systems participate in the evaluative process
underlying human learning, recent psychophysiological studies have identi-
ed a generic distributed error processing system that is associated with scalp
potentials elicited during tasks of choice economy [30]. Although the system
has been termed \error-processing," this is a bit of a misnomer. Rather,
it has been hypothesized that it is a general reinforcement learning system
through which a human characterizes the dynamics of their environment and
generates predictions of how much utility can be acquired from the environ-
ment under certain actions [21]. Over the short term, this system guides
action selection and is hypothesized to play a role in longer-term integrative
learning through interaction with the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia
[21].
Recent studies have identied scalp Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) that
reect this model-building process and are readily detected on single trials
using time-frequency signal processing techniques. Specically, these error
potentials have been correlated with theta power over medial and lateral
electrode sites during learning [7]. While several studies have explored the
application of error potentials to BCI, none has considered theta power on
single trials and its application to a co-adaptive BCI architecture, to this
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author's knowledge [26, 9]. In this chapter, we review the neural basis for
these ERPs and justify the reinforcement learning model that underlies their
elicitation. We argue that these error potentials { notably the observational
feedback-related negativity { can be applied to a stochastic control-based
BCI to train agents through passive observation.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 surveys the major human
error potentials. Section 2 summarizes several studies pertaining to the ob-
servational feedback-related negativity, and argues that the oFRN and FRN
are essentially equivalent signals. Section 3 presents a quantiable model for
the FRN that can be used to design brain-computer interfaces.
2.1 Survey of Human Error Potentials
Studies investigating error-related EEG signatures have identied a class
of error ERPs, including the Error-Related Negativity (ERN), Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN), and Observational Feedback-Related Negativity
(oFRN). In this section, we review the literature concerning these ERPs and
justify the reinforcement learning model of the oFRN.
2.1.1 Error-Related Negativity
The Error-Related Negativity (ERN) was jointly discovered in 1990 by sepa-
rate research groups { those of Falkenstein and Gehring [13, 17]. On epoch-
averaged error trials during choice-reaction time experiments, a 10 V neg-
ative deection was observed in frontocentrally located EEG sites approxi-
mately 100 ms after commission of an error. The ERN was shown to scale
with the magnitude of the commissioned error, and it was hypothesized that
the ERN is reective of a neural system that both detects and compensates
for errors [17].
Although initially thought to be elicited only on error trials, subsequent
studies presented evidence that its proposed generator { the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) { was also activated on correct trials [6, 14]. In a follow-up
study by Falkenstein, a small negativity was noticed after some correct trials
[14]. In light of this result, later studies proposed that the magnitude of the
ERN is not reective of the absolute value of outcomes but rather a devi-
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ation in expected outcome [32, 46]. This evidence suggested that the ERN
encodes a type of prediction error and led to Holroyd and Coles's reinforce-
ment learning model [21].
Holroyd and Coles's reinforcement learning theory of the ERN is based
on studies implicating the basal ganglia and midbrain dopamine system in
reinforcement learning. According to this theory, the basal ganglia function
as a critic that evaluates events and predicts the value of outcomes. When
events deviate from expected, the basal ganglia induce phasic changes in
the activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons. These phasic increases and
decreases are prediction error signals that indicate the magnitude of deviation
in expectation. The prediction error signals are projected from the basal
ganglia to the ACC and prefrontal cortex, where they are used to induce
behavioral adaptation by compensating executive control systems.
Despite evidence in favor of Holroyd and Coles's theory of the ERN, an
alternative theory known as the Conict Monitoring Hypothesis has been
oered as an explanation [3]. According to this model, the ACC detects
conicts in information processing and recruits executive control systems to
resolve them. Conict is considered the simultaneous activation of incompat-
ible processes. The essence of this model is that it treats the ACC as a passive
monitor that attempts to resolve incongruities. This account is distinct from
the model advocated by Holroyd and Coles, because the conict monitor-
ing hypothesis does not treat the ACC as implementing a response-selection
function that weights competing motor controllers.
To date, debate remains as to which hypothesis is true. However, several
studies of the ERN's close cousin { the feedback-related negativity { provide
compelling evidence that Holroyd and Coles's reinforcement learning model is
a useful framework for characterizing the dynamics of these error potentials.
2.1.2 Feedback-Related Negativity
Several years after discovery of the ERN, a related error signal termed the
feedback-related negativity (FRN) was reported by Miltner, Braun, and
Coles [31]. Subjects were tasked with detecting an auditory cue, and press-
ing a button after they thought a second had passed from cue onset. 600
msec after the button press, subjects were presented with an auditory, vi-
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sual, or a somatosensory indication of either a correct or incorrect estimate.
Approximately 230 to 330 ms after incorrect feedback, epoch-averaged ERP
waveforms showed a negative deection lasting approximately 260 ms that
was largest at medial electrode sites. The study presented evidence that this
deection, termed the feedback-related negativity, was related to the ERN
but distinct in that it was invoked following feedback as opposed to error
commission.
It was postulated that the ERN and FRN are elicited by the same system
and that the reinforcement learning model of the ERN would also model the
FRN. Several follow-up studies showed that FRN amplitude covaried with
expectation deviation in medial electrode sites [20, 24, 23, 22, 25, 1]. These
studies investigated a variety of tasks { monetary gambling, choice-reaction,
and Erikson Flanker. The reliability of the ERN and FRN in tasks of choice
economy suggests that it is elicited by a system that is able to adapt to spe-
cic paradigms as necessary. Holroyd and Coles investigated this issue and
found that the error processing system is generally context-dependent [23].
Holroyd and Coles's result is readily understood in the context of reinforce-
ment learning. All reinforcement learning problems are context-dependent,
in that agents bring unique reward functions to each problem. The predic-
tion error signals (FRN, ERN, oFRN) are functions of this reward and hence
reect context-dependence.
There has been some debate about the relationship between the FRN,
P300, N2, various visual evoked potentials, and other non-error-related com-
ponents. In an eort to understand how the FRN responds to reward mag-
nitude and valence as opposed to the P300, Yeung had subjects complete
a simple gambling task. They found that the P300 is sensitive to reward
magnitude but insensitive to reward valence and the feedback negativity ex-
hibits the opposite behavior. This nding suggests that the P300 and FRN
originate in separate systems that perform distinct functions [46]. For the
purposes of this thesis, the relationship between the FRN and other ERPs is
not essential.
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2.2 Equivalence of oFRN and FRN
Traditional ERN and FRN studies have investigated ERP elicitation during
tasks when the subject is able to act on his or her own behalf. However,
since the reinforcement learning model suggests that subjects build models
of expectation, it is possible that ERNs and FRNs can be elicited during
observation of others since agency is not required to acquire utility. Several
recent studies in observational learning and social cognition have considered
whether the FRN is elicited during observational learning. A wide body of
literature addresses the role of mirror neurons { neural circuits that are active
in both the observer and observed during monitoring tasks [38, 4]. Some of
these circuits have been attributed to systems that evaluate or predict the
actions of others [37]. While the literature on the oFRN is sparse and its
relation to the FRN is not entirely clear, mirror neuron studies provide some
evidence that the oFRN is reliably elicited during observation. Here, I argue
that the oFRN is essentially equivalent to the FRN, but it is amplied by a
sense of agency and motivation.
Although not the rst paper exploring the oFRN, Donkers designed a slot
machine task in which participants did not make choices [12]. This paradigm
ensured that the elicitation of the FRN would not be contingent on preced-
ing choices. They observed FRN-like mediofrontal negativity associated with
outcomes. Further, they found that the observed FRN was elicited when-
ever a stimulus was dierent from the preceding stimulus, irrespective of
whether that stimulus averted a loss or a gain. The general morphology of
the mediofrontal negativity that they observed was similar to that of the
FRN, suggesting that they are elicited by similar processes. Further, they
found that the mediofrontal negativity was more right lateralized { but this
may be task specic, as monetary gains and losses have often been more right
lateralized.
An earlier paper by Miltner et al. studied error potentials for subjects
that observed a simulated subject performing a choice reaction time task
[30]. Observation was not purely passive, since subjects were instructed to
either count the number of errors committed by the simulated subject or
to press a button when an error was committed. The response to observed
errors was notably similar to the FRN. In particular, they found that the
P300 was not enhanced following error observation and that the negativity
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was an interruption of a positive wave (P300) approximately 200-350 ms after
error commission.
While Donkers and Miltner studied the oFRN under gambling and choice-
reaction tasks, Van Schie conducted an Erikson Flanker task, during which
subjects both performed the task and observed an experimenter perform the
task [39]. Observers were instructed to count the number of errors committed
by the experimenter. On observation of incorrect trials, subjects elicited a
delayed onset, reduced amplitude, and elongated ERN (230 ms).
Are these observational error potentials localized to ACC as the ERN and
FRN? In a study conducted by Shane, subjects participated in a speeded
go-nogo task, and then watched an actor perform the same task [40]. The
study provided hemodynamic evidence that the ACC is implicated during
the observation of another's errors, suggesting that similar neural circuitry
is involved in both self- and observer-commissioned errors.
Yu considered oFRN elicitation during observation of a simple monetary
gambling task [48]. As in the case of Donkers, Miltner, and Van Schie, the
oFRN was elicited with reduced amplitude. It is notable that under Erikson
Flanker tasks, reaction-time tasks, and gambling tasks the oFRN is elicited
with a topology and morphology approximate to that of the FRN.
The studies by Miltner, Van Schie and Yu provided compelling evidence
that the oFRN is elicited by systems responsible for the FRN. However, dur-
ing each of these studies, subjects were instructed to count or were provided
with a monetary reward. These features make it unclear under which condi-
tions the observational error system is activated. It is essential that the BCI
practitioner be able to construct paradigms in which the oFRN is elicited
reliably.
To further clarify the conditions under which observational error potentials
are elicited, Koban studied how dierences in social context could inuence
the response to observed errors [28]. Participants performed a modied go-
nogo task, in which one subject performed the task while another observed.
Subjects either cooperated or competed (the observer either desired the ac-
tive subject to succeed or fail). On error trials during cooperation, subjects
tended to elicit an early oFRN component at approximately 130 ms. Further,
this oFRN was fronto-centrally located and a deection in a larger positiv-
ity that peaked around 150 to 220ms. They attributed this positivity to an
overlap of the visual evoked N1 and P2. This positivity is similar to the
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positivity discovered by Falkenstein during active-choice tasks and provides
further evidence that the oFRN and FRN are elicited by the same neural
system [14].
While the oFRN is elicited during observation, there is evidence that purely
passive observation is not sucient to elicit the signal. Several studies have
directly sought neural correlates of agency and empathy during observation
tasks [15, 42]. Kang investigated the relationship between self-other over-
lap and oFRN amplitude [27]. It was demonstrated that oFRN amplitude
is signicantly reduced when observing nonhuman agents. This result is of
particular importance to the BCI practitioner, since it indicates that empa-
thy and self-other overlap may play a signicant role in the human learning
process and aect signal quality. Although not considered in this thesis, the
social context in machine-based learning may be a central issue for the BCI
practitioner, particularly if the oFRN is reective of a learning process that
is fundamentally dierent from human-human interactive learning.
In another study investigating the role of agency, Yeung observed feedback-
related negativities in monetary gambling tasks in which subjects both made
and did not make choices [45]. The amplitude of the component was reduced
in these tasks relative to a task in which the outcomes were contingent upon
participants' choices. This nding suggests that the amplitude of the FRN
is sensitive to both subject motivation and sense of agency.
Furthering the argument that agency is essential, Bellebaum argues that
the processing of feedback stimuli depends upon the direct relevance for one's
own action planning [1]. Hence, reduced amplitude error potentials are ob-
served in the observational case. Further, FRN amplitude was modulated
by reward expectancy during observation, although the dierence in ampli-
tude on less probable negative outcomes was more pronounced in the active
feedback condition.
The aforementioned studies suggest that the oFRN is reliably elicited in a
variety of tasks { including choice reaction time, go-nogo, Erikson Flanker,
and monetary gambling. In general, this error potential is of a similar latency
and morphology with that of the FRN, although it appears to be modulated
and amplied by sense of agency, self-other overlap, and motivation. Topo-
logically, it is elicited in medial electrode sites. In general, subjects interact
with BCI systems because they want the system to do or acquire something.
Hence, they are generally invested in its performance. This natural coop-
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eration suggests that the problem of agency may not be signicant for BCI
practitioners, but since the oFRN has not been studied as widely as the FRN,
it is an important design consideration.
The reduced amplitude of the oFRN poses a special problem for the BCI
practitioner. ERPs are generally dicult to detect on single trials. Hence,
most paradigms { such as the P300 { use signal averaging to increase SNR.
While one approach to this problem is to develop novel signal processing tech-
niques for single-trial ERP detection; another solution is to nd correlations
between the oFRN and other signal measures. The next section addresses
this possibility.
2.2.1 FRN Correlates with Medial Theta Power
Studies investigating the frequency characteristics of the ERN [29] have
shown that the ERN reected enhanced theta activity (4-8 Hz) following
incorrect responses. As further evidence, Luu and Tucker observed an FRN
in response to error feedback after band-pass ltering their data in the theta
range, suggesting that much of the energy in the FRN is concentrated in the
theta frequencies [29].
Based on this observation and evidence that the ERN and FRN are elicited
by the same error processing system, Cohen hypothesized that increased
theta activity over medial electrodes would occur on error trials [10]. They
observed that enhanced theta power and ERPs occurred following wins. This
study was also notable because they observed larger ERPs under the con-
dition when rewards were relatively infrequent, and smaller ERPs during
frequent rewards. This nding suggests that the FRN scales with expecta-
tion { hence, as the subject learns about the dynamics of the environment
or builds an accurate model of the environment, the tendency to elicit large
FRNs is reduced. This result further supports Holroyd and Coles's reinforce-
ment learning model of the FRN, and provides evidence that theta power is
a reliable correlate of the FRN.
The correlation between prediction error signals and theta power is par-
ticularly powerful, since signal processing methods to detect theta power are
simple to implement. Cohen and Cavanagh have classied FRNs on single
trials using complex Morlet wavelets and instantaneous power computed us-
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ing Hilbert transforms [7]. These algorithms can be easily implemented in
an online BCI.
2.3 A Model for Error Potential Dynamics
While the aforementioned error potentials have been strongly correlated with
prediction error on epoch-averaged trials, the reinforcement learning model
of the FRN predicts that their magnitude should scale with the subject's
deviation in expectation on single trials [21]. This hypothesis has not been
widely tested, since the ERP technique relies on epoch-averaged trials that
preclude single-trial analysis. While the amplitude of epoch-averaged trials
under distinct conditions can be compared, single-trial techniques are not
widely applied in psychophysiology.
For BCI practitioners, this has led to the adoption of a simplied model of
the FRN. BCI applications that use the FRN often treat it as a binary error
signal [36, 26]. While this model can be useful, it arbitrarily discards essential
information. If the FRN is a prediction error signal, then it implicitly encodes
a hidden variable { the subject's estimate of the agent's behavior. Hence,
attempting to minimize errors will not guarantee convergence to the subject's
desired policy. When prediction error signals cease to be elicited, this means
that the agent is behaving as the subject expects, which is not the same
as behaving as the subject desires. Hence, our goal is to design a BCI that
extracts the subject's desired policy. This requires that we model the subject
as a learning system and attempt to identify his hidden policy.
By exploiting the relationship between theta power and the FRN, it is
possible to implement this model. A recent study has shown that theta power
in medial electrode sites scales with outcomes that are worse than expected,
while theta power in lateral electrodes tends to scale with outcomes that are
both better and worse than expected [7, 8]. In that same study, both theta
power and theta phase synchrony between medial and lateral sites were shown
to predict behavioral adaptation in subjects that were learning to interact
with a stochastic environment. By measuring the combined eect of medial
and lateral theta power, the prediction error on single trials can be measured
and integrated into a BCI.
While Holroyd and Coles simulate an adaptive critic-actor architecture
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as their generative model of the FRN, Cavanagh models the subject as a
Q-Learner with a time horizon of individual trials [7, 21]. Q-Learning is
a special case of temporal dierence learning, and hence these models are
closely related. By modeling the human as a Q-Learner, we can exploit
its simplicity to gain intuition about how humans learn relative to a BCI.
Further, both Cavanagh and another recent study have shown that theta
power scales with prediction error on single trials [7, 35]. To date, these are
the only two studies that have investigated the reinforcement learning model
of the FRN on single trials. Hence, we will model our human observer as a
Q-Learner in the sections that follow.
We note that our model hinges on an important assumption that to this
author's knowledge has not been investigated. Notably, we assume that
subjects will elicit theta power under the same conditions as in Cavanagh
during passive observation. While Cavanagh and others have shown that
theta power correlates with prediction error signals, all of these studies have
concerned cases where subjects were able to act on their own behalf. As
presented earlier in this thesis, there is ample reason to believe that this will
happen, since the oFRN generally maintains a morphology and topological
distribution similar to that of the FRN. However, we will implicitly test this
hypothesis in the scheme that follows.
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Chapter 3
A BCI Stochastic Control Framework
In this chapter, we will formalize the model developed in the previous chap-
ter to design a BCI based on human error potentials. The rst section will
review Q-Learning, since it serves as a model for the human observer. The
second section will discuss the specialization of Q-Learning to the BCI de-
sign problem. The third section will propose a control framework based on
the Bayesian control rule to design the BCI. The fourth section will derive
distributions that are necessary for application of the Bayesian control rule.
The fth section will provide necessary and sucient proofs of convergence.
Detailed mathematical derivations and code have been relegated to the ap-
pendix.
3.1 Canonical Q-Learning
Reinforcement learning theory considers the problem of an agent that is
interacting with an environment in order to obtain a certain amount of utility.
For instance, consider a sh looking for food in a shark tank. At each time
point, the sh must observe the environment and consider the location of the
shark and potential locations of food rewards. Then, it must make a decision
{ should it swim closer to the food, or away from the shark? After making
its decision, it changes its position relative to both the food and shark and
must prepare to take another action. The goal of the sh is to maximize its
utility by obtaining food rewards in the fewest steps possible while avoiding
the shark. However, the sh does not know how the shark will react to each
of its movements. The sh does not know how the environment (the shark)
will change with each of its decisions, nor does it know how much utility
it will acquire with each decision. The sh must learn how to pick actions
based on past experience in order to maximize its utility. This is a problem
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Figure 3.1: Reinforcement Learning. An agent perturbs an environment
by eliciting actions, while the environment generates the next state and a
reward.
of reinforcement learning.
Referring to gure 3.1 above, note that the reinforcement learning problem
consists of two interacting systems { an agent and environment. In most
reinforcement learning problems, the environment is modeled as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). An MDP is a tuple, M = fS;A; P; ;Rg where:
 S is a nite set of states
 A is a nite set of actions
 P is a state transition probability matrix
  is a discount factor bounded by 0    1
 R : S  A! R is a reward function
  : S ! A is the policy which maps states to actions
We make use of the following notations and constraints:
 St+1 is a random variable, where St+1  P (St+1jst; at)
 Rt+1 is a random variable, where Rt+1  P (Rt+1jst; at)
 Outcomes r of R are bounded by 0  r  1
The goal of the agent is to learn a policy  that achieves a certain amount of
utility. In general, the goal is to learn a policy that maximizes the expected
cumulative discounted utility. Such a policy is said to be optimal and is
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denoted by . When the reward function, R, and the transition environment
dynamics, P , are known, the agent can solve for  using Bellman's Equation:
V (s) = max
a
"
r(s; a) + 
X
s0
P (s0js; a)V (s0)
#
(3.1)
For convenience, we will dene the state-action or Q values as follows:
V (s) = max
a
Q(s; a) (3.2)
Substituting into equation (3.1) we have,
max
a
Q(s; a) = max
a
"
r(s; a) + 
X
s0
P (s0js; a)max
a0
Q(s0; a0)
#
(3.3)
from which it follows that,
Q(s; a) = r(s; a) + 
X
s0
P (s0js; a)max
a0
Q(s0; a0) (3.4)
This equation is simply a restatement of Bellman's equation in terms of
the state-action values. If we return to the learning problem stated at the
beginning of this section, we note that the agent does not know the reward
distribution or the state transition dynamics, leaving equation (3.4) of little
direct value. However, we can dene the observed reward and transition
probabilities as follows:
r(s; a) = E [Rt+1jst = s; at = a] (3.5)
P (s0js; a) = P (St+1 = s0jst = s; at = a) (3.6)
which results in the following iterative update expression for the Q-Values:
Qt+1(st; at) = R(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) (3.7)
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Figure 3.2: A human observer Q-learns the combined dynamics of the agent
and environment. The observer critiques the agent through the TD error, t.
Each time the agent takes an action, he or she recovers a reward. By adding
memory through the parameter , we arrive at a form of value iteration over
the Q-values. The scheme is called Q-Learning [43]. It is dened according
to the following equation:
Qt+1(st; at) = (1  )Qt(st; at) + 
h
R(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0)
i
(3.8)
Q-Learning is powerful because it does not require the agent to represent
the value function explicitly. Instead, an agent navigates its environment, ob-
tains rewards, and updates Q-Values as necessary. Furthermore, Q-Learning
allows the agent to readily compute an optimal policy. For a given state, the
agent simply chooses the action with the maximal Q value.
3.2 Modeling the Human Observer as a Q-Learner
Under canonical Q-Learning, an agent evaluates the environment according
to equation (3.8) and computes a policy based on the learned Q values. Now
suppose that the agent is not able to implement a policy on his own behalf.
Rather, an actor implements a policy on behalf of the Q-Learning observer,
as depicted in gure 3.2.
This setup is similar to an actor-critic scheme, in which the observer criti-
17
cizes the actions taken by the actor. The observer communicates a prediction
error signal to the actor that species the observer's deviation in expected
reward. The prediction error is derived as follows from equation (3.8):
Qt+1(st; at) = (1  )Qt(st; at) + 
h
R(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0)
i
= Qt(st; at) + 
h
R(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) Qt(st; at)
i
= Qt(st; at) + t (3.9)
where t is the prediction error,
t = R(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) Qt(st; at) (3.10)
We note that this is precisely the model suggested by the reinforcement
learning theory of the Feedback-Related Negativity. The observer learns
about the environment and elicits a Feedback-Related Negativity, t, that is
proportional to the prediction error. Further, this model does not require that
the observer act on his own behalf in order to elicit an FRN. Assuming that
the error-processing system builds a model of expected outcomes according
to a reinforcement learning scheme such as Q-Learning, the FRN will be
elicited during passive observation. While we have modeled the observer as
a Q-Learner based on results from the literature, other schemes for the critic
are plausible [7].
Based on the work of Cavanagh we assume that the oFRN will scale with
medial and lateral theta power on single trials [7]. Although no study has
tested this hypothesis to date, a wide body of literature shows the relationship
between the FRN and theta power at medial electrode sites [47, 41, 7]. Since
the morphology of the oFRN is similar to the FRN (with reduced amplitude)
and localized to the ACC, it is likely that theta power will correlate with the
oFRN during passive observation. However, it should be noted that our
scheme rests on this assumption.
In practice, noise in the EEG measurements and modeling inaccuracies
will contribute noise to the prediction error signal. We dene et as t with
additive Gaussian noise:
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et = t + n (3.11)
where n  N(0; 1
p
), and it is assumed that p is a constant that is known.
Since our observer is critiquing an agent, we assume that the observer has
a deterministic reward function. Therefore, we replace the R in equation
(3.8) with r. We further assume that before the observer begins interacting
with a BCI agent he will x his learning parameter , discount factor , and
initial Q values, Q0. To summarize our model, the human observer can be
completely characterized by the following two equations:
Qt+1(st; at) = (1  )Qt(st; at) + 
h
r(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0)
i
et = r(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) Qt(st; at) + n (3.12)
where n  N(0; 1
p
).
Hence, the human observer is a Q-Learner parameterized by w = [Q0; r; ; ].
We now proceed to formulate the BCI control problem.
3.3 Problem Statement
Given a human observer that learns about a BCI agent according to Q-
Learning (equation (3.8)) and elicits prediction error signals according to
equation (3.12), construct a BCI agent that is optimal with respect to the
reward function of the observer.
According to this problem formulation, the observer belongs to a class
of observers { specically the class of Q-Learners parameterized by w =
[Q0; r; ; ] for w 2 W. It is assumed that both the observer and BCI agent
know the dynamics of the environment, p(s0js; a). Since the dynamics are
known, if the BCI agent can recover the observer's reward function, r, he
can solve Bellman's equation for  and maximize the observer's expected
discounted cumulative reward.
This is an adaptive control problem, because the agent and observer are
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Figure 3.3: A human observer generates error signals, t, according to the
parameter w. The goal is to design a BCI agent that is optimal with respect
to r, the reward function of the observer.
simultaneously learning about each other. Although adaptive control prob-
lems are generally dicult to solve and often intractable, when the observer
is believed to belong to a class for which optimal BCI agents are available,
it is possible to construct an agent that is optimal with respect to the class
of observers. The rule for designing such an agent is given by the Bayesian
control rule [34].
3.4 Bayesian Control Rule
Now we formulate a scheme to identify the reward function of the human
observer and design a BCI agent that is optimal with respect to a human
observer drawn from a class of observers. Throughout this section, we will
refer to the human observer as the environment, and the BCI agent as the
agent. Figure 3.3 depicts the problem formulation. The environment gen-
erates symbols, oi 2 O, and the agent generates symbols, ai 2 A. Each
observation consists of a state and prediction error, oi = fsi+1; ig. The
environment is parameterized by w 2 W and is xed before the interaction
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starts. For each w 2 W, there is a set [w] consisting of all w0 2 W such that
the optimal policy for mode w0 is the same for w. In other words, for each w
there may exist an equivalence class of [w] which all induce the same optimal
agent.
For each environment w 2 W, it is assumed that there exists an optimal
agent denoted by the measure Q. Hence, if w were known, the designer would
choose Qw to be the agent. In general, however, the environment is unknown
but is believed to belong to a class of environments, W. The goal is to design
an agent Q that is optimal with respect to this class of environments and
will converge to the agent for the true environment, w 2 W.
This problem can be formulated as an adaptive coding problem over the
action-observation sequence, Z = a1; o1; a2; o2; :::, generated by the coupled
agent and environment [34]. Adaptive coding is the problem of compress-
ing observations from an unknown source. Universal compressors solve this
problem by minimizing the average deviation between a predictor and the
true source and then constructing code words using the predictor [34]. In our
setup, this consists of constructing a predictor, Q, and measuring its devia-
tion from the true distribution, Qw, using the KL-Divergence. The diculty
with formulating the problem this way is that the actions are generated by
the agent. Hence, doing inference over the action-observation stream in-
cludes doing inference over one's own actions, which can lead to paradoxes,
since actions themselves do not provide the agent with any information. The
Bayesian control rule addresses this problem by treating actions and ob-
servations as random variables and using causal conditioning. That is, the
Bayesian control rule treats actions as interventions, thereby obeying the
rules of causality.
We state the Bayesian control rule as follows:
Given a set of operation modes P (jw; ) over interaction sequences, Z, and
a prior distribution P (w) over the parameters W, the probability of the action
at+1 is given by:
P (at+1ja^t; ot) =
X
w
P (at+1jw; at; ot)P (wja^t; ot) (3.13)
where the posterior probability over operation modes is given by the recursion
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P (wja^t; ot) = P (otjw; a
t 1; ot 1)P (wja^t 1; ot 1)P
w0 P (otjw0; at 1; ot 1)P (w0ja^t 1; ot 1)
(3.14)
3.5 Derivation of Likelihood and Intervention Models
In order to apply the Bayesian Control Rule, we must compute three things:
1. A likelihood model for observations: p(otjw; ot 1; at 1)
2. An intervention model for actions: p(at+1jw; at; ot)
3. A posterior distribution over operation modes: p(wjat; ot)
We start by deriving a likelihood model for observations:
p(otjm; ot 1; at 1) = p(et; st+1jw; ot 1; at 1) (3.15)
= p(etjw; ot 1; at 1; st+1)p(st+1jw; ot 1; at 1)(3.16)
= p(etjw; at; st+1; st)p(stjst; at) (3.17)
where (3.15) follows because ot = (et; st+1).
(3.16) is by application of the chain rule for probabilities.
(3.17) follows because the environment dynamics are assumed to be Markov
and the same for all m.
Referring to equation (3.17), p(stjst 1; at 1) is simply the state transition
dynamics of the MDP, which are assumed to be known. To compute the
prediction error likelihood, p(etjw; at; st+1; st), we note that:
et = r(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) Qt(st; at) + n (3.18)
where n  N(0; 1
p
), so that et is normally distributed,
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et  N(; 1
p
) (3.19)
 = r(st; at) + max
a0
Qt(st+1; a
0) Qt(st; at) (3.20)
The likelihood model consists of a family of normal distributions param-
eterized by . We note that the operation modes consist of Q0, so that the
current Q values can be computed by rolling back to the initial Q values.
Next, we derive the intervention model for actions. Since the state transi-
tion dynamics are assumed to be known, given an environment w, the optimal
action is the action suggested by Bellman's equation:
p(at+1jw; at; ot) =
(
1 if a = (s) for  satisfying (3.1)
0 otherwise
Finally, we must compute the posterior belief over operation modes. If we
discretize the operation modes and place a uniform prior over them, we can
update the posterior directly according to equation (3.14).
These three distributions are all that is necessary to apply the Bayesian
control rule. As will be shown in the next section, this scheme should con-
verge since the environments are well-parameterized (it is clear which oper-
ation modes belong to the same equivalence class) and the Markov chain is
ergodic.
3.6 Necessary and Sucient Conditions for
Convergence
The Bayesian control rule is guaranteed to converge to the equivalence class
of the true operation mode when the operation modes are consistent and
exhibit bounded variation. Ortega appeals to divergence process theory to
show that these two properties are necessary conditions for convergence [34].
Rather than restating their arguments, we will summarize these two neces-
sary conditions and prove a sucient condition for convergence based on an
analysis of the stability of the nonlinear lter.
Bounded variation can be understood as an ergodicity assumption. For the
purposes of this thesis, the Markov chain describing the environment must
23
be ergodic. For details concerning bounded variation in terms of divergence
processes, refer to [34].
Operation modes w and w are consistent if and only if w 2 [w] implies
that for all  < 0, there is a t0 such that for all t  t0 and all (at; ot 1),
jP (atjw; at; ot)   P (atjw; a;ot)j < . In words, this means that if we expect
w to have the same behavior as w, then w has to converge to w's policy.
This condition is really a design condition { if we properly parameterize
the operation modes and understand the equivalence classes to which they
belong, consistency can be achieved.
While these sucient conditions aid in controller design, it is convenient to
have a necessary and sucient condition that is easily testable. Recent work
by Gorantla and Coleman have shown that necessary and sucient conditions
for achieving reliable message point communication can be stated in terms
of the stability of the nonlinear lter [18]. We note that the Bayesian control
rule consists of a nonlinear lter that updates its posterior belief according to
causal conditioning. We can exploit their result to derive a relation between
the prior over operation modes and the cardinality of the equivalence class
of the true operation mode. We show that the Bayesian control rule will
converge if and only if it is designed with respect to this relation.
We will make use of the following denitions in the lemmas and proofs
that follow:
 Dene w to be the prior for which ([w]) = 1 and (fw0g) = 1j[w]j for
any w0 2 [w].
 Dene  to be the prior that is uniformly distributed on W.
 Dene wn to be the posterior given by the causal nonlinear lter with
initial condition w0 = 
w.
wn =
P (onjw; an 1; on 1)wn 1P
w0 P (onjw0; an 1; on 1)w0n 1
(3.21)
 Analogously, dene n to the posterior given by (3.21) where the initial
condition is 0 = .
 Dene P = P(w; a1; o1; a2; o2; : : : )
 Dene P = P(w; a1; o1; a2; o2; : : : )
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We will use the following identity:
dP
dP
=
dW
d
(W ) (3.22)
We will dene Contraction as follows:
Denition 3.6.1 We say that the Bayesian control rule is \contractive" if
n([W ])! 1 in P: (3.23)
Contraction is the property that the posterior computed by the Bayesian
control rule will place all of its mass on the equivalence class of operation
modes with probability 1. This is equivalent to stating that the scheme
converges on the set of operation modes that induce the same policy. We
now provide a necessary and sucient condition for contraction:
Lemma 3.6.2 Contraction occurs if and only if
D
 
Wn kn
! 0 in P (3.24)
Proof 3.6.3
D
 
Wn kn

=
X
w
Wn log
Wn
n
(3.25)
For simplicity we assume Wn has all of its mass at w
 2 W. Therefore,
Wn (w
) = 1 and Wn (w) = 0 for all w 6= w. So the above expression reduces
to
D
 
Wn kn

= Wn (w
) log
Wn (w
)
n(w)
(3.26)
Since n([W ])! 1 in P we have that
D
 
Wn kn
! 0 in P (3.27)
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We exploit lemma 3.6.3 to derive a necessary and sucient condition that
relates the cardinality of the equivalence class of operation modes and an
expectation over the modes.
Lemma 3.6.4 Contraction occurs if and only if
E

du
d
(W )jFY1;1
 
u=W
=
1
j[W ]j : (3.28)
Proof 3.6.5
E [g(W )jY n = yn] =
E

g(W )dP
dP jY n = yn

E

dP
dP jY n = yn

=
E

g(W )d
d
(W )jY n = yn
E

d
d
(W )jY n = yn
=
X
w
g(w)
d
d
(w)
E

d
d
(W )jY n = yn n(dw)
Thus, we have
dn
dn
(W ) =
d
d
(W )
E

d
d
(W )jY n = yn (3.29)
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For a xed u and ,
D (unkn) = E

log
dun
d n
(W )jY n = yn

= E
"
log
du
d
(W )
E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn jY n = yn
#
= E

log
du
d
(W )jY n = yn

 E

log E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn

jY n = yn

= E

log
du
d
(W )jY n = yn

  log E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn

=
X
u0
log(
1
j[u0]j1f[u0]=[u]g)
u
n(du
0)
  log E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn

=   log j[u]j   log E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn

Therefore
D
 
Wn kn

= D (unkn)u=W
=   log j[W ]j   log E

du
d
(W )jY n = yn

u=W
:
This lemma relates the cardinality of the equivalence class of the true
operation mode to the prior placed on the operation modes. While this
provides a necessary and sucient condition for convergence, it is not an
easily testable condition. Future work will attempt to nd an easily testable
property of the Markov chain that will guarantee this property, and hence
guarantee convergence.
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Chapter 4
Simulations and Results
The stochastic control framework was applied to a simple game. Results were
obtained that show the posterior contracts to position all of its probability
mass over operation modes with the true reward function.
4.1 Methods
The waterfall game is a simple game consisting of a grid with four squares
(refer to gure 4.1). Obstacles are denoted by yellow squares, and the agent
is denoted by either a red square or a green square. At each time step,
obstacles in row 1 fall to row 2, and a new obstacle may be added to row 1.
If the obstacle that falls into row 2 collides with the agent, the agent turns
red. If the agent avoids the obstacle, it remains green. At each time step, the
agent can either stay in its lane, or switch to the other lane. Further, at each
time step one of three possible obstacles can be added to row 1. They are
shown in the gure. The obstacle position in row 1 is drawn from a uniform
distribution. The game consists of 18 states total (a state consists of the
Figure 4.1: The waterfall game. At each time step, the obstacle in row 1 falls
down to row 2, and a new obstacle may be introduced randomly into one of
the lanes in row 1. The agent can choose either to remain in his lane or to
switch to the other lane. If the agent avoids the obstacle, he stays green. If
he hits the obstacle, he turns red.
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colors of all squares on the board) and two actions. This game was designed
because it is simple for observers to follow and it permits a variety of reward
functions to be implemented.
Each human observer, w, was parameterized as w = [;Q0; r]. The learn-
ing rate parameter, , was discretized so that  2 f0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8g.
Five dierent sets of Q0 were initialized randomly so that each Q0(s; a) 2
f0; 1g. Five dierent reward functions were initialized randomly so that each
r(s; a) 2 f0; 1g. All combinations of the parameters were computed, yielding
a total of 125 operation modes.
The BCR was applied according to the likelihood and intervention models
derived in the previous chapter. Since the operation mode parameters were
discretized, the posterior could be computed directly for each mode. The
human agent was modeled as the Q-Learner described in chapter 3, eliciting
noisy prediction errors with p=1. The algorithm is summarized as follows:
Set initial state to s = s0.
for t=1 to 200
Sample w  p(wjat; ot)
Set a : V (s) = maxa [r(s; a) + 
P
s0 P (s
0js; a)V (s0)]
Obtain o = (s0; )
Update p(wjat; ot) according to equation (3.14)
end for
Several simulations were run for dierent observers, w. Simulations were
run over 200 trials. In practice, each trial would consist of about 750ms
stimulus presentation followed by 750ms of processing for an average 1.5s
per trial. Convergence in under 200 trials means that the optimal policy is
recovered in fewer than 5 minutes.
4.2 Results
The plots in gures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are for a simulation with true operation
mode 14 and reward function 3. It is clear from the plots that the Bayesian
control rule converged on a subset of the equivalence class of the true oper-
ation mode. Further, the scheme converged in about 100 trials. This is an
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Figure 4.2: Posterior on operation modes after 200 trials. After 200 trials,
the BCR places its probability mass on several operation modes. Note that
most of the mass is on the true mode, 14. The next plot shows that these
operation modes are in an equivalence class, and that the algorithm has
converged.
average time to convergence of approximately 2.5 minutes, which is essential
to maintain subject interest in an online BCI paradigm.
Using this simple waterfall paradigm, subjects can be instructed to im-
plement a wide variety of reward functions. For instance, subjects can be
instructed to collide with all of the obstacles (attempt to keep the agent red),
avoid all of the obstacles (keep the agent green), hit all obstacles on the left,
hit all obstacles on the right, and many others. Further, the task can be used
to test the subject's sense of agency. For instance, subjects can be instructed
to use motor imagery to guide the agent { even if the paradigm does not
make use of motor imagery in selecting actions. This trick can be used to
test how the subject's sense of agency inuences BCI performance. These
modications will be considered in future work.
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Figure 4.3: Posterior on reward functions after 200 trials. After 200 trials,
the BCR positions all of the probability mass on modes with the true reward
function.
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Figure 4.4: Probability of the true reward vs. trials. The plot shows the
value of the posterior on operation modes containing the true reward against
trials.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
We have developed a stochastic control framework for designing BCIs that
exploit the observational Feedback-Related Negativity prediction error sig-
nals. Based on simulations, we can use prediction error signals to infer the
reward function and desired policy of a human observer. This scheme is par-
ticularly useful for design problems in which the subject wishes to train a
BCI algorithm, rather than communicate messages on a trial-by-trial basis.
The paradigm can be used to understand a variety of human learners.
Although we derived a Q-Learning model for the human observer, other
architectures are plausible and may prove more computationally tractable.
The Q-Learning model that we have presented here is well-supported in the
literature { but most experimental tasks under which Q-Learning has been
applied have been simple. BCIs that incorporate prediction error signals over
larger state and action spaces will likely encounter forms of learning that are
not captured in a simple Q-Learning model. Our scheme is general enough
to accomodate enhanced models of human learning.
We note that the framework is suciently general to add volitional signals.
For instance, it would be possible to add motor rhythm classications to the
observation stream. These signals may accelerate convergence and increase
the subject's sense of agency, thereby increasing the oFRN amplitude. We
intend to test the relationship between agency and BCI performance in the
future.
There is obvious future work to extend this proof of concept. Human sub-
ject testing is of immediate need, to verify that the scheme works online.
Further, while we have provided a necessary and sucient condition for con-
vergence, it is not easily testable. Future work will investigate easily testable
conditions for convergence. Finally, a thorough investigation studying the
relation between theta power on single trials and the oFRN is needed to
better characterize the oFRN dynamics.
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